The Influence of Historical Tax Law Developments on Anglo-American Laws and Politics by Cockfield, Arthur J. & Mayles, Jonah
  
The Influence of Historical Tax Law Developments 
on Anglo-American Laws and Politics 
 




This article highlights the influence of historical Anglo-American tax law 
developments on the formation of new political institutions and laws.  In critical periods 
of English and U.S. history, individuals rebelled against arbitrary royal taxes.  In turn, 
they demanded new tax laws that became embedded in documents from the Magna Carta 
to the English Bill of Rights to the Declaration of Independence that promoted 
democratic constraints on the use of state power to assess and collect taxes.  Over time, 
the idea that individuals are entitled to equal treatment under the law, and possess 
inalienable human rights, emerged in part as a result of these tax law developments.  The 
discussion in this article supports the view that pragmatic concerns over property and 
taxation drove important English and American political and legal reforms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article shows how certain historical tax law developments shaped important 
Anglo-American political/legal institutions.  In critical periods of English and U.S. 
history, individuals rebelled against arbitrary royal taxes.1  In turn, they demanded new 
tax laws that became embedded in documents from the Magna Carta to the English Bill 
of Rights to the U.S. Declaration of Independence that promoted democratic constraints 
on the use of state power to assess and collect taxes.  Pragmatic concerns over property 
and taxation hence drove important English and American political and legal reforms. 2  
Under this article’s account, the political struggle over, and implementation of, tax laws 
led to political views by early English and American peoples that they, not the Crown, 
were the true sovereigns of their destinies.3 
The article is organized as follows.  Part II discusses how the Charter of Liberties 
of 1100, the Magna Carta of 1215, and the Confirmation of Charters of 1297 in England 
provided the world’s first “good” tax laws that restricted the ability of the king to tax his 
subjects as he saw fit, leading to the first tax disputes and the struggle to develop 
appropriate due process protections.  Part III reviews how dissatisfaction with arbitrary 
royal taxation in 17th century England culminated in the Petition of Right of 1628, The 
Three Resolutions of 1629, the Bill of Rights of 1689 and the emergence of England as a 
constitutional monarchy.  The era also witnessed renowned tax prosecutions (in the Bate, 
Cony, Five Knights and Hampden cases) that animated the productive bourgeoisie class 
against oppressive taxation measures.  As a result of these disputes, this class of English 
                                                 
1 This article adopts a “big history” perspective by examining several discrete eras over a large time 
scale.  For discussion of this approach, see David Christian, The Case for “Big History”, 2 J. WORLD HIST. 
223, 225 (1991) (noting that “big history” encourages a search for larger meanings in the past and discussing 
pitfalls and critiques of the approach).  For a discussion on the potentials and limits of comparative history 
that compares and contrasts different eras and/or countries, see William H. Sewell Jr., Marc Bloch and the 
Logic of Comparative History, 6 HIST. AND THEORY 208, 214–18 (1967). 
2 This account supports the view that important political and legal institutions were shaped to a 
significant extent by taxation concerns.  For other views that emphasize how pragmatic concerns over 
taxation and debt, not theoretical philosophical concerns, shaped early American democratic institutions, see 
generally, NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM - AND WHAT WE SHOULD 
DO ABOUT IT (2005) (asserting that the doctrine of church/state separation within the U.S. Constitution was 
mainly attributable to religious groups’, including Baptists and Quakers, opposition to compulsory religious 
taxation); CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION (2005) (claiming that taxation concerns played a decisive role in shaping the U.S. 
Constitution).  Prior literature has explored and emphasized the influence of protections against arbitrary 
royal prerogative found in early law, but has generally downplayed or ignored the role of tax laws. See, e.g., 
ANNE PALLISTER, MAGNA CARTA: THE HERITAGE OF LIBERTY (1971); FREDERIC JESUP STIMSON, THE LAW OF 
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1908) (comparing civil and criminal 
protections under U.S. law with those in the Magna Carta); Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” 
Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 175–84 (1928) (emphasizing how 
theories concerning liberty and the king’s role influenced U.S. constitutional law).  Some historical accounts 
of tax matters focus on political developments without referencing in any detail the legal aspects of these 
developments.  See also DAVID F. BURG, A WORLD HISTORY OF TAX REBELLIONS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAX 
REBELS, REVOLTS, AND RIOTS FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT (2004) (providing a comprehensive 
discussion of historical tax rebellions). 
3 The emphasis on how historical tax developments can shed light on modern political/legal 
institutions is drawn from the views of Joseph Schumpeter: “The fiscal history of a people is above all an 
essential part of its general history . . . In some historical periods the immediate formative influence of the 
fiscal needs and policy of the state on the development of the economy and with it on all forms of life and all 
aspects of culture explains practically all the major features of events . . . He who knows how to listen to its 
message here discerns the thunder of world history more clearly than anywhere else.”  JOSEPH A. 
SCHUMPETER, THE ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY OF CAPITALISM 100–01 (Richard Swedberg ed., 1991). 
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people became increasingly convinced that representative and fair tax laws were a 
necessary prerequisite to achieving a just and free society. 
Part IV traces the role of tax laws in the American Revolution and subsequent 
development of the Republic, emphasizing colonial anger against “bad”, or 
unrepresentative English taxes without due process protections for tax disputes.  These 
bad tax laws included the Stamp Act, the Townsend Revenue Act, and the Tea Act, which 
led to passage of “good” tax laws, including the First Congressional Declaration, the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.  
Part V outlines how these Anglo-American tax developments, which influenced 
political and legal institutions, encouraged English and American peoples to adopt norms 
amenable to liberal political philosophical theories, including the movement toward ever-
greater equality and democracy. Part VI summarizes and concludes.  
II. MAGNA CARTA AND THE CHARTER OF LIBERTIES: THE FIRST TAX LAWS 
The roots of taxation go back to earliest recorded history, establishing the 
depressing truism that taxes and death are the only two certain things in life.4  Taxes have 
always been interwoven with a nation’s fabric because a state needs revenues and 
resources to pursue its goals.  So any rules or customs that promoted or restricted taxation 
have historically played an important role in defining the relationship between an 
individual and her larger community or country.5  As we shall see, something changed 
around the year 1100 when English kings began to be bound by laws that circumscribed 
their powers over taxation.  These tax laws influenced the development of nascent 
governing councils and other political institutions as well as legal protections where 
individuals could challenge the legality of royal taxation through court hearings.   
 The Baronial Tax Uprising 
Our story begins with angry barons in the 13th century in what we now call 
England, then ruled by cruel King John of Robin Hood fame.  John may have been a 
cruel and unwise king by most historical accounts, but his kingdom was faced with 
numerous vexing problems.6 
First, John’s brother—King Richard the Lionheart—had embarked on an 
expensive crusade to regain the Holy Land from the Muslims.  Richard’s efforts had 
mixed results, at best.7  He was defeated twice by King Saladin then kidnapped, forcing 
John to raise the necessary funds to pay the ransom.8  Richard was a soldier, not a 
statesman, and the finances of his kingdom suffered for it.9  In 1199 Richard died, and his 
brother John inherited the throne at about the age of 32, along with a financially 
mismanaged kingdom. 
                                                 
4 For discussion of the earliest Western account of Persian and Egyptian tax rules by the Ancient 
Greek historian Herodutus, see Arthur J. Cockfield, Introduction: The Last Battleground of Globalization, in 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS TAX DISCONTENTS 3 (Arthur J. Cockfield ed., 2010). 
5 For a comprehensive discussion on the relationship between taxation and political institutions, see 
LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 3, 11 (2002) (“[Taxes] are 
also the most important instrument by which the political system puts into practice a conception of economic 
or distributive justice.”). 
6 G.O. SAYLES, THE MEDIEVAL FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLAND 389–399 (1950).  
7 Id. at 381. 
8 Id. at 382. 
9 Id. at 381. 
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Second, there was an ongoing dispute between King John and the Pope.10  With 
the death of the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1205, custom dictated that the king present 
the successor who would then, as a matter of formality, be confirmed by the church in 
Canterbury.11  However, without waiting for John’s chosen appointee, John De Gray, the 
monks elected their prior Reginald to act as the Archbishop to Rome.12  King John 
eventually forced their hand and the church elected De Gray as Archbishop and sent him 
to Rome for investiture.13  The papal authorities, however, had other ideas and Pope 
Innocent III decided to put his own man, Stephen Langton (who would later play a 
prominent role in the uprising against King John), in place.14  The king’s denouncement 
of this decision led to his excommunication in 1209;15 the matter was ultimately settled 
when the King accepted Langton as Archbishop and agreed that England would become a 
vassal of the Vatican.16  The cost, however, was steep: the Pope was now entitled to 
substantial and ongoing compensation. 
The third and final nail in nation’s fiscal coffin was that King John himself 
embarked on various failed military campaigns to regain his ancestral homelands in 
Normandy, which were taken away during his rule when Norman feudal lords backed his 
nephew, Arthur of Brittany.17  The loss of Normandy resulted in an estimated reduction 
of one-third of King John’s total income.18  At the end of John’s last campaign, the 
English armies were easily defeated at the Battle of Bouvines in what is now Northern 
France on July 27, 1214 and John had to now prepare for a civil war back home in 
England.19 
All of this led to a rather distressing financial situation on the home front, which 
John tried to address through increased taxation.  In particular, John resorted to the use of 
feudal taxes called scutage and other levies (such as arbitrary fines) to replenish the royal 
treasury.20  With feudalism came a relationship between lord and vassal tied to the tenure 
of land.  These feudal taxes could ordinarily be levied at the king’s discretion but custom 
dictated that extraordinary exactions required the consent of the vassal.21  Traditionally, 
the king could expect his barons to participate and supply manpower in times of war.22  
However, it was becoming more common for the barons to pay the king a fee in place of 
their services; this tax in place of a knight’s service was called scutage.23  
Mercenaries established themselves by the 12th century; kings frequently used 
them, rather than knights, to fight their wars. 24   Consequently, during his reign and 
                                                 
10 Id. at 394. 
11 DAVID NICHOLAS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE MEDIEVAL WORLD: SOCIETY, GOVERNMENT AND 
THOUGHT IN EUROPE, 312–1500, at 230 (1992) 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 231. 
15 SAYLES, supra note 6 at 394. 
16 Id. at 395. 
17 NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 228, 238. 
18 Id. at 229. 
19 J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 188–89, 221 (2d ed. 1992). 
20 J.C. Holt, THE MAKING OF MAGNA CARTA (1965). 
21 See WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF 
KING JOHN 232 (1914). 
22 Id. at 233–34. 
23 Id.   
24 H.G. RICHARDSON & G.O. SAYLES, THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND FROM THE 
CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA 375 (1963).  
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particularly during his campaigns in Normandy, John levied a total of eleven scutages 
and even deviated from the custom of levying the tax at the end of the war by using tax 
measures at the beginning of a war.25  It has been contended that scutage was effectively 
converted into a general tax.26  
On May 26, 1214, John issued writs for the collection of scutage at a rate of three 
marks, which was higher than any rate imposed over the last half century.27  The northern 
barons, who would later be instrumental in forcing John to sign the Magna Carta, refused 
personal service and scutage in place of their service on the ground that they were not 
obligated to fight overseas.28  Scutage was a driving force behind the creation of the 
Magna Carta, not only because of its amount, but also because of its frequency.29 
John in effect used his feudal rights over taxation as a system of manipulation 
and as a means of controlling the barons.30  John would issue writs for excessive taxes 
and, when certain barons could not pay, John used the baronial debts to enforce political 
discipline.31  Those out of favour with the king would frequently be called upon to repay 
their debts quickly or suffer additional penalties or imprisonment. 32   In 1213 while 
preparing for his campaign in Poitou, John called on a number of debtors to provide the 
service of knights in lieu of payment or required the debtors to accept terms of payment.33  
In addition, John instituted new measures of taxation while also exercising his customary 
rights.  He raised the amounts of feudal incidents, extended the forest law by assessing 
charges on newly cultivated land, and married heiresses to persons of his choice.34 
The barons were understandably distressed by these developments and began to 
stir up a rebellion against the king.  They were supported by Langton and the clergy, who 
had also become susceptible to John’s heavy taxation.  In 1207, for instance, the clergy 
were forced to contribute 60,000 pounds to the crown treasury.35  Although the uprising 
which lead to the signing of the Magna Carta cannot be construed as the result of a 
unified cause among the varied classes of English society, it is important to note that the 
barons, while acting in their own interests, had the support of the clergy and, at least to a 
certain extent, the lower classes.36   
                                                 
25 See HOLT, supra note 19 at 318–19.  Two of his eleven scutages were levied despite no “full-
scale campaign.”  Id. at 319.    
26 GOTTFRIED DIETZE, MAGNA CARTA AND PROPERTY 22 (1965).  
27 SHEPARD ASHMAN MORGAN, THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENTARY TAXATION IN ENGLAND 58, 60 
(1911). 
28 Id. at 60. 
29 Id. at 50. 
30 J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA AND MEDIEVAL GOVERNMENT 134 (1985). 
31 Id. at 136. 
32 Id. at 136–37.  
33 HOLT, supra note 19 at 193–94. 
34 NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 229–30. 
35 RICHARDSON & SAYLES, supra note 24, at 376. 
36 The clergy, as already mentioned, were not immune from ruthless taxation, and when the barons 
were heavily taxed, a great deal of the hardship was placed on the commoners.  There were also practical 
reasons why the barons wanted to support the interests of their workers.  The barons were land-holders who 
lived off subleases to a productive class of farm workers; increased taxation on the barons meant that they 
would be forced to increase charges to these workers.  Unhappy commoners might even revolt against the 
members of the nobility—there were a number of peasant tax revolts throughout Medieval Europe—placing 
the lives of the barons and their families at risk.   
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 The Signing of the Magna Carta and the Charter of Liberties 
To the barons, the situation was unsustainable and they stormed and captured 
London, ultimately forcing John to capitulate and sign a document entitled the Magna 
Carta (Latin for "Great Charter") at Runnymede on June 15, 1215.37  The Magna Carta is 
considered one of the first legal documents to impose clear restrictions on the king’s 
powers: it established the principle that no one, including the king, is above the law and is 
often cited as one of the first steps in a historical process that eventually led to the rule of 
law within modern democracies.38   
In fact, the less-mentioned Charter of Liberties (sometimes referred to as the 
Coronation Charter39) signed by Henry I in 1100 was likely the first document to bind 
the English royalty to tax laws.40  The document was written a mere thirty four years after 
the Normans conquered Briton and slew the last truly English king, Harold, at the Battle 
of Hastings.  Henry, perhaps seeking to quell ongoing rebellions against the new rulers, 
makes it clear in the first paragraph of his Charter that arbitrary taxation concerns also 
motivated its issuance: “And because the kingdom has been oppressed by unjust 
exactions, I, through fear of God and through the love that I have for you all”41 grant a 
number of freedoms, including the abolishment of taxes such as the seigniorage, which 
was roughly equivalent to a modern day sales tax. 
King Henry, unlike King John, enthusiastically embraced the idea of cutting back 
his power over taxation through tax laws.  This is evidenced by his Grant of Tax Liberties 
to London in 1133 where he provided for sweeping exemptions from royal taxation so 
that London could assess and collect its own tax.42  While Henry’s rule might seem like a 
natural place to begin a discussion of restrictions on arbitrary taxation, his Charters 
apparently had far less precedential value, in both the common law and the collective 
memories of the English, than the Magna Carta.  Nevertheless, the Charter of Liberties 
has been said to have influenced the subsequent baronial tax revolt against John and 
inspired the principles set out within the Magna Carta.43 
Because the king was considered to be divine both the Charter of Liberties and 
the Magna Carta can be viewed as revolutionary documents: they were akin to putting 
hand-cuffs on God.  The sixty-three Chapters of the Magna Carta read very much like a 
tax statute, filled with qualifiers and caveats, cross-references, definitions, appeals to 
broad generalities and special preferences; in short the sort of writing only a tax lawyer 
could love.  Importantly, Chapter 12 illustrates the restrictions placed on the king in 
levying certain taxes on the barons: 
No scutage nor aid shall be imposed on our kingdom, unless by Common 
Council [sometimes translated as “common counsel”] of our kingdom, 
except for ransoming our person, for making our eldest son a knight, and 
                                                 
37 MORGAN, supra note 27 at 61–62. 
38 See, e.g., PALLISTER, supra note 2; DIETZE, supra note 26, at 3–7.  See also H. D. Hazeltine, The 
Influence of Magna Carta on American Constitutional Development, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1917) (discussing 
the influence of the Magna Carta on the laws of the American colonies and the subsequent U.S. Constitution). 
39 DIETZE, supra note 26, at 8. 
40 Charter of Liberties of Henry I, 1100, INTERNET MEDIEVAL SOURCE BOOK – FORDHAM 
UNIVERSITY (Feb. 1996), http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/hcoronation.asp.  
41 Id. at ch. 1. 
42 Henry I, King of England: Grant of Tax Liberties to London, 1133, INTERNET MEDIEVAL SOURCE 
BOOK – FORDHAM UNIVERSITY (Oct. 1998), http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1133Hank1tax.asp. 
43 See PALLISTER, supra note 2, at 2.  
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for once marrying our eldest daughter; and for these there shall not be 
levied more than a reasonable aid.  In like manner it shall be done 
concerning the aids from the city of London.44 
This provision and Chapter 14, which sets out the process by which Common Council 
will be derived, are particularly notable because they are the only provisions within the 
Magna Carta that require agreement by the Common Council and thus restrict the ability 
of the king to do what he pleases.45  While the Magna Carta deals with a variety of other 
state issues,46 there are no additional provisions that create a Council to scrutinize royal 
decision-making on an ongoing basis (although more general Chapters 52 and 61 
provided for the creation of a body with twenty-five elected barons who would ensure 
that the king abided by his agreement to grant the listed freedoms if disputes arose).47  
This highlights the fact that concerns over arbitrary taxation were front and center in the 
barons’ minds.  
It is also important to take note of which taxes were included in the two chapters.  
A tallage, as opposed to an aid, means “a toll or exaction imposed on individuals who had 
no option of refusal.”48  Tallage could be imposed on town citizens by the king at his 
prerogative.49  Tallage was omitted from the Charter, most likely because tallage had no 
great effect on the barons: the residents of cities were subjected directly to the tax 
whereas the barons predominantly resided in the countryside.50  The absence of any 
mention of tallage supports the commonly-held view that the Charter was not a 
revolutionary document constructed with the purpose of furthering republican ideals of 
equality but rather was created to protect the barons from the king’s prerogative to collect 
taxes at will:51 “the ‘barons had no suspicion that they would one day be called the 
founders of English liberty’ and that the Charter simply embodied the immediate 
practical interests which had driven them into rebellion.”52  There is no indication that the 
barons were concerned with the rights of all classes against arbitrary taxation.  Chapter 
14, for instance, which stipulates who constitutes the Common Council—archbishops, 
bishops, abbots, earls, and greater barons—does not mention a representative of the 
common classes.53 
Soon after signing the Magna Carta, King John rescinded his support for the 
document and promptly died of dysentery.54  After John’s death, his son Henry III was 
crowned King of England at the age of nine in 1216.55  Henry could not immediately 
assume power due to his age so the government was in the hands of his regent.56  The 
                                                 
44 Magna Carta, ch.12. 
45 See Magna Carta chs. 12, 14. 
46 In fact, the Magna Carta and the Charter of Liberties contain more provisions that grant rights to 
women, mainly prohibitions against marrying women against their will, than tax provisions.  See, e.g., Magna 
Carta, ch. 8; Charter of Liberties ch. 3. 
47 Magna Carta, chs. 52,61. 
48 MCKECHNIE, supra note 21, at 235.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 236–38. 
51 See HOLT, supra note 19, at 267–68 
52 Id. at 268 (quoting CHARLES PETIT-DUTAILLIS, ETUDE SUR LA VIE ET LE REGNE DE LOUIS VIII 57–
58 (1894). 
53 Magna Carta, ch. 14; see also Max Radin, The Myth of Magna Carta, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 
1060 (1947) (noting that only two clauses in the Magna Carta discuss aspects of political liberty). 
54 W. L. WARREN, KING JOHN 253 (3d ed. 1997). 
55 Id. at 254. 
56 MORGAN, supra note 27, at 73. 
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Charter was promptly reissued with, most notably, Chapters 12 and 14 omitted.57  The 
barons were able to assume substantially more power with a young king on the throne.58  
With an end to John’s tyranny, the Council did not favour restricting royal power 
especially in light of the fact that they were, at least indirectly, wielding the royal 
prerogative.59  Chapter 44 of the reissued Charter states scutage “shall be taken as it was 
wont to be taken in the time of King Henry our uncle.”60  There is no mention of consent 
by Common Council and the only restriction is that scutage should not exceed the amount 
of 20 shillings.61   
Despite the exclusion of Chapters 12 and 14, as we shall see, the reissued 
Charter did not expel their principles from English thought or the common law.62  This 
did not prevent future rulers from levying taxes without consent.  The difference would 
be that when the king found himself facing opposition for his tax policies, those opposing 
the exactions would claim legal rights under the Magna Carta.  There is some evidence 
that the older version of the Charter was still followed.  For example, in 1222, there is 
record of the Common Council granting an “aid for the Holy Land” of three marks for an 
earl, one mark for a baron, and twelve pence for a knight.”63 
In any event, similar provisions to the original Magna Carta were reintroduced, 
including provisions mandating the use of a Common Council in taxation matters, in the 
so-called Confirmation of Charters of 1297.64  The barons once again rose up in armed 
rebellion against their king, Edward, due to his imposition of steep taxes on English wool 
as well as aids levied against the nobility.65   
Legal historians have carefully scrutinized the role of the Magna Carta in 
subsequent legal developments: much of the literature, however, emphasizes the 
document’s innovative civil and criminal procedural protections against arbitrary Crown 
power.66  In fact, because the collection of tax often requires intrusive inquisition of a 
person or their property, the civil and criminal protections are very much related to the 
protections against arbitrary taxation.  As we shall see, later English commentators 
emphasized the writ of habeas corpus as a protection against unlawful intrusions by tax 
collectors.  
All of this led to what may have been one of the first tax law disputes.  In 1217 
Peter des Roches, in an apparent struggle against the growing baronial influence over the 
Crown, refused to pay an aid of two marks on the knight’s fee on the grounds that he had 
not consented to the levy.67  Des Roches paid the tax bill after the barons issued a writ 
imposing scutage on January 24, 1218, which was signed as being “assessed by the 
common council of our realm.”68 




60 Id. at 75. 
61 Id.  Twenty shillings was the rate during the reign of King Henry II.  Id.   
62 See HOLT, supra note 19, at 397–99. 
63 MCKECHNIE, supra note 21, at 233–34 (citing KATE NORGATE, THE MINORITY OF HENRY III 194 
(1912). 
64 Confirmation of the Charters, 1297, INTERNET MEDIEVAL SOURCE BOOK – FORDHAM UNIVERSITY 
(Feb. 1996), http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/conf-charters.asp. 
65 MORGAN, supra note 27, at 141. 
66 See supra discussion in note 2. 
67 Holt, supra note 19, at 399. 
68 MORGAN, supra note 27, at 76-77. 
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Peter des Roches was later involved in another dispute regarding taxation without 
consent.69  In 1220, des Roches along with the Earls of Chester and Salisbury led a 
“widespread resistance” to the assessment of a tax.70  The knights of Yorkshire refused to 
execute the writ stating that the tax had not been conceded by the magnates (i.e., 
powerful nobles) and the king’s faithful subjects.71  The knights argued that the magnates 
of the county did not know of nor were consulted on the levy, and it was therefore not a 
valid exaction.72  The barons repeated and furthered the same argument some thirty-five 
years later when Henry III demanded an aid. 73   This time the barons made direct 
reference to the fact that the aid was not raised in accordance to the terms of the 
Charter.74 
Taxation disputes were hardly resolved with the Great Charter; it was merely the 
first step in a long, drawn-out dispute over the power of taxation.  This battle would be 
fought between the monarchy and nobility for centuries to come.  Yet the Magna Carta 
and its restrictions on the king’s ability to levy exactions on the properties and persons of 
his realm can be portrayed as an important initial step in the long march towards the 
political philosophy of liberalism (see Part V).  One of the next major shifts would not 
come until the reigns of Charles I and Cromwell, almost four hundred years later. 
III. SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND: THE RISE OF TAX LAW DISPUTES 
Once the barons got a taste of freedom, more tax trouble lay ahead, including tax 
uprisings in the thirteenth through sixteenth century.  Despite these troubles, there was 
very little progress in the development of tax laws until the seventeenth century, when the 
political climate would once again be ripe for the English aristocracy to gain more control 
over taxation.75  This century witnessed the birth of what is easily recognizable as modern 
England.  Again, turmoil and tax laws played a fundamental role in reshaping the 
relationship between the state and the individual, providing fertile ground for growing 
individual freedom that was extended for the first time to the non-elites of English society 
(although the struggle was primarily concerned with protecting the rights of a productive 
bourgeoisie class against the political power of the landed gentry). 
A. King James Versus John Bate 
Soon after the seventeenth century began, England became embroiled in a 
contentious tax dispute involving an unhappy merchant named John Bate.  At the time, 
King James’s kingdom was running an annual deficit of roughly 150,000 pounds. 76  
James decided to raise revenues by way of an additional levy on merchants, in addition to 
the traditional “currants.” 77   By harkening back to the Magna Carta, John Bate, a 
merchant for the Levant Company, challenged the right of the king to levy these 
additional amounts.78  The barons presiding over the Court of Exchequer unanimously 
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decided in favor of the King and against Bate. 79   The decision became a notorious 
example of the King’s desire for absolute authority over the nation’s finance, leading 
many members of the emerging middle-class of artisans and entrepreneurs to question the 
absolutist rhetoric of baron Clarke who wrote in his judgment that “any subjects [cannot] 
contend with the King in his high point of prerogative . . . As it is not a kingdom without 
subjects and government, so he is not a king without revenue . . . .”80   
As mentioned in the previous sections, the barons were increasingly perceived as 
being together with the King in their complacency with respect to arbitrary taxation.81  
The Bate case was widely publicized among the bourgeoisie class who were increasingly 
resentful of unproductive land-holders, including the barons and King James.  To English 
people of this earlier era, the Bate case represented the tyrannical impulse of the English 
monarchy and nobility.82  The Bate case would be subsequently used by King Charles as 
a precedent to argue for his own attempts to broaden taxation, which culminated in 
disastrous results for the English monarchy.83 
King James died in 1625 and was followed by King Charles, then a young man 
of twenty-five. 84   Like John before him, Charles was obsessed with reclaiming lost 
territories through war and his disastrous foreign campaigns created an ever-growing 
need for more revenues.85  Yet Parliament had grown in power since the time of the 
Common Council to a body with real power to constrain the King’s revenue raising 
abilities.  A Parliamentarian could now be a member of the merchant class, who felt that 
taxation stifled their productive activities.  Much to Charles’ dismay Parliament refused 
to consent to the additional subsidies needed for his proposed campaigns.86 
On June 15, 1626, Charles dissolved Parliament in part to put a stop to the 
constant attacks by the House of Commons against his adviser and ally, the Duke of 
Buckingham.87  Unfortunately, the dissolution of Parliament only worsened Charles’s 
fiscal problems and frustrated his ability to finance Buckingham’s ongoing foreign 
campaigns.88  Buckingham’s forays into France ended in defeat at the Isle of Rhe, which 
left Charles without a victory and, more importantly, without the spoils of war which he 
intended to use to rectify his kingdom’s worsening financial situation.89 
B. The Case of the Five Knights, the Petition of Right and the Three 
Resolutions 
To finance additional campaigns, Charles instituted what would later be called 
"forced loans."90   The "loans" were roughly equivalent to taxation as a subject who 
refused to pay was sentenced to prison without a formal hearing or due process, hence the 
"forced" aspect of the loan.91  Since the time of the Great Charter, the need for consent to 
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taxation, as previously discussed, was limited, if at all, to specific types of taxation; the 
King was hence ostensibly permitted to exact other taxes and loans without consent.  
Nevertheless, five of the knights detained for their opposition to the loans protested their 
imprisonment based on their denial of due process rights set out in previous Charters.92  
In the Case of the Five Knights, the courts again sided with the King, increasing public 
resentment among the nobility and the merchant class against the King’s absolute 
authority in a court of law.93   
Despite his failures in France and, later, Spain, Charles stubbornly persisted in 
his view that, with sufficient funding, he would eventually overcome his enemies.  In 
1628, Charles summoned another session of Parliament and called for its consent to 
increased levels of taxation.94  But Parliament refused consent, in part over unhappiness 
surrounding the forced loans and the Case of the Five Knights.95   
Before Parliament would agree to grant Charles additional revenue sources, a 
group within the House of Commons, led by Sir Edward Coke and Sir John Eliot, drew 
up the Petition of Right:  
[B]y which statutes before mentioned, and other the good laws and 
statutes of this realm, your subjects have inherited this freedom, that they 
should not be compelled to contribute to any tax, tallage, aid, or other 
like charge not set by common consent, in parliament.96 
The Magna Carta clearly played a role in the development of this document.  Coke and 
others argued that the Magna Carta reflected more ancient traditions dating back to 
Britain prior to the invasion and conquest by the Norman armies in 1066.97 
King Charles initially refused to sign the Petition of Right but, desperate for more 
revenues, ultimately gave in and signed the document on June 7, 1628.98  It has been said 
that Parliament’s limited ability to exert control over taxation played a decisive role in 
forcing Charles to agree to limitations on his royal prerogative to issue forced loans.99  
Once the document was signed, Parliament granted Charles additional taxes that would 
raise 275,000 pounds.100  The Petition of Right can be seen as an important expansion of 
Parliament’s ability to control aspects of taxation because parliamentary consent was now 
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required for taxes beyond "aids" and "scutages" to encompass "any tax, tallage, aid, or 
other like charge" (a non-exhaustive list familiar to readers of tax statutes).101 
The link between due process protections against arbitrary imprisonment for 
failure to pay taxes and tax concerns is also evident within the Petition of Right: 
And whereas also by the statute called "The Great Charter of the 
Liberties of England," it is declared and enacted, that no freeman may be 
taken or imprisoned or be disseized of his freehold or liberties, or his free 
customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, but by the 
lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.102 
Like King John, Charles was eventually undone by his unquenchable thirst for for 
revenue sources.  Despite the signing of the Petition, King Charles continued to issue 
taxes without parliamentary approval and continued to imprison those who refused to, or 
could not, pay. 103   When challenged, Charles sometimes relied on the previously-
mentioned Bate case as the legal authority for these continued actions.104   
In yet another effort to curtail the King’s taxation policies, in 1629 Sir John Eliot 
drafted The Three Resolutions.105  In stark contrast to the Magna Carta and the Petition 
of Right, Eliot addressed his document directly to the people and not to the King himself.  
The second and third resolutions called on the people of England to refuse payment of the 
King’s latest taxes: 
[Resolution] 2.  Whosoever shall counsel or advise the taking and 
levying of the subsidies of Tonnage and Poundage, not being granted by 
Parliament, or shall be an actor or instrument therein, shall be likewise 
reputed an innovator in the Government, and a capital enemy to the 
Kingdom and Commonwealth. 
[Resolution] 3.  If any merchant or person whatsoever shall voluntarily 
yield, or pay the said subsidies of Tonnage and Poundage, not being 
granted by Parliament, he shall likewise be reputed a betrayer of the 
liberties of England, and an enemy to the same.106 
Eliot’s goal was to make the payment of the King’s unapproved taxes an act of treason.107  
Because they directly appeal to all royal subjects, The Three Resolutions can be seen as a 
much more radical and revolutionary document than its predecessors.  Yet The Three 
Resolutions has suffered from relative obscurity when compared to the Magna Carta or 
the Petition of Right.  A plausible explanation for this may be found in the fact that the 
King had instructed his obedient Speaker of the Commons, Sir John Finch, to adjourn 
Parliament when The Three Resolutions were introduced. 108   Other members of the 
Commons protested this adjournment and Finch was physically held down by the 
protestors who shouted their approval of the Resolutions, although no formal vote was 
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apparently taken to make it an official document. 109   Sir Eliot was arrested and 
imprisoned in the Tower of London where he died of illness.110  Charles gave up in his 
attempts to sway the members of the Commons and dissolved Parliament, and so began 
his eleven year personal rule of England.111 
C King Charles Versus John Hampden: The Ship-Money Case 
To forestall financial ruin, King Charles implemented new tax initiatives, the 
most disastrous of which was the ship-money tax.  The king had previously levied a tax 
on coastal towns to force these towns to construct ships for defense in the event of 
invasion and siege.112  This form of taxation, however, had never caused much trouble 
until Charles renewed it with more vigor and ambition than ever before.  On October 20, 
1634, the first writ of ship-money was issued to several coastal towns, raising a little over 
104,000 pounds.113  The King appointed his crony, Sir John Finch, as the Chief Treasurer 
and Finch promptly issued a new writ on August 4, 1635 that, without precedent, 
extended the ship-money taxes inland.114  Moreover, unlike the forced loans, the ship-
money tax was levied on all classes of society:  this expanded tax, it has been noted, 
influenced the formation of a broad coalition of discontent stretching to every town and 
class as more and more English men and women were swept into the tax net.115 
The extension of the exaction of ship-money to all classes also helped to make 
the ship-money case of John Hampden into one of national interest as its outcome 
affected more than the nobility.  Hampden, a lawyer and parliamentarian, had previously 
been incarcerated for a year in 1628 for refusing to pay the forced loans.116  In 1637, 
Hampden refused to pay the assessment of ship-money tax (a mere twenty shillings) 
levied on his lands and his dispute came before the Court of the Exchequer.117  The 
renowned and widely respected lawyer Sir Oliver St. John represented Hampden and 
delivered what has been called “the finest argument that had ever been heard in 
Westminster Hall.”118  His argument was also notable as it lasted “two whole days”!119  
Looking back to ancient tax principles allegedly developed during the Saxon times, the 
Magna Carta and the Petition of Right, St. John argued that the King was prohibited from 
subjecting individuals to arbitrary taxation: 
For the first, that to the altering of the property of the subject's goods, 
though for the defence of the realm, that a parliamentary assistance is 
necessary . . . My Lords, the Parliament, as it is best qualified and fitted 
to make this supply for some of each rank, and that through all the parts 
of the kingdom being there met, His Majesty having declared the danger, 
they best knowing the estates of all men within the realm, are fittest, by 
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comparing the danger and men's estates together, to proportion the aid 
accordingly.120 
St. John argued that, pursuant to the law, the ship-money tax and all other extraordinary 
levies required the consent of Parliament.121  By restricting the King’s power to tax, royal 
subjects increasingly viewed their income and properties as their own.  St. John’s 
argument appears to be closely-aligned with “the belief that the subject possessed 
property which was truly his own and could not be taken from him without his consent, 
[which] played a major part in shaping men’s beliefs and in determining their policies 
and actions.”122  
In spite of St. John’s spirited defense, the court ruled seven to five in favour of 
the Crown, agreeing that that the ship-money exaction was within the King’s discretion to 
protect the country in times of imminent danger.123   News of the court proceedings 
rapidly spread throughout the country by “means of coffee-houses, clubs, and news-
letters.”124  As in the cases of Bate and the Five Knights, the court’s judgment led to 
widespread resentment and disillusionment concerning King Charles’s rule. 125  
According to a contemporary, the court’s decision provided a shock to those who thought 
the rule of law circumscribed the king’s powers as the case was seen "to be a meere 
delusion and imposture, and doubtlesse it is but a picklock tricke, to overthrow all liberty 
and propriety of goods, and it is a great shame that so many Judges should be abetters to 
such fraudulent practice contrived against the State."126  In the eyes of the English, the 
court system was revealed to be a mere puppet of royal prerogative that danced to an 
increasingly distressful tune: 
and all assuring themselves, that when they should be weary, or 
unwilling to continue the payment, they might resort to the law for relief 
and find it . . . and, instead of giving, were required to pay, and by a logic 
that left no man any thing which he might call his own . . . .127 
The ship-money case, under the traditional view, was instrumental in the impending Civil 
War, the toppling of Charles, and the ascension of Cromwell, in part because the case 
united the classes of England against arbitrary royal rule.128  While there are clearly other 
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motivating factors, including Protestant-Catholic religious turmoil, Charles’ tax laws and 
public reaction to these laws were decisive factors that led to the overthrow of his rule.129   
Charles’ personal rule ended in 1640 when civil war erupted throughout the land, 
culminating in his beheading for "high treason and other crimes," the first time that an 
English monarch had been put on trial.130  In August 1641, members of the Commons 
met and declared ship-money and the proceedings against Hampden to be illegal: 
That the said charge imposed upon the Subject for the providing and 
furnishing of Ships commonly called Shipmoney . . . were and are 
contrary to and against the Laws and Statutes of this Realm the right of 
property the libertie of the Subjects former resolutions in Parliament and 
the Petition of Right made in the third yeare of the Reign of his Majestie 
that now is.131 
This group, which came to be known as the Long Parliament, fomented the Great 
Rebellion that secured the paramountcy of Parliament over the Crown in English 
politics.132  The ship-money protests are considered to have served as a pivotal event in 
English political history133: of course, like all historical events, these protests did not 
occur in a vacuum but can be related to other events centuries in the making.  
Nevertheless, the struggle surrounding the power to tax provided the necessary impetus 
to stir up revolution.  Parliament would subsequently take a more active role in governing 
and sharing power with monarchy. 
D. Cromwell Versus Cony the Elder: The Return to Arbitrary Taxation 
After King Charles was overthrown, Cromwell assumed control over the 
country.134  After years of costly civil wars and rebellion, Cromwell inherited a nation 
with a depleted treasury.  Initially viewed as a man of the people, Cromwell appears not 
to have learned lessons from his predecessors concerning unwise tax policies.  He turned, 
like the kings before him whom he had opposed, to taxation to resolve this problem.  The 
Cony tax case helped to transform Cromwell from a man of the people into a despised 
despot like the tyrants of old.  The event that led to the dispute, where Cony the Elder and 
his son George resisted what they viewed as illegal taxation, was recorded by a 
contemporary of Cony as follows:  
That the said Cony the elder and George Cony the younger and others 
did on the fourth day of this instant November, 1654 affront and abuse 
Theophilus Colcoke and others, Deputies for the Commissioners of the 
Customes in the execution of the trust to them committed, and 
particularly opposed, beat, or caused to be beaten some of the said 
Deputies when they peaceably entered the house of the said Cony, in 
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which severall great quantities of silks, for which no Custome was 
payed, were lodged.135 
When Cromwell summoned Cony to appear before him, Cony asserted, as did The Three 
Resolutions, that it was in fact treasonous to submit to Cromwell’s illegal taxation: 
that all who submitted to them, and paid illegal taxes, were more to 
blame, and greater enemies to their country, than they who had imposed 
them; and that the tyranny of princes could never be grievous, but by the 
tameness and stupidity of the people.136   
Cromwell proved to be unsympathetic and sentenced Cony the Elder to prison for refusal 
to pay the tax.137  Cony’s counsel, Maynard, argued for his client’s freedom on the basis 
that his client had been denied due process and that the tax amounted to an illegal 
exaction.138  To the horror of many, Cromwell incarcerated Maynard in the Tower of 
London for having the audacity to question his authority.139  This in turn led to the 
resignation of a presiding judge, Justice Rolle, at Cony’s trial, belying Cromwell’s earlier 
claims that he would support a more independent court through non-politicized 
appointments to the bench.140   
Justice Rolle was a reputed independent thinker who resigned in opposition to 
Cromwell’s continued use of arbitrary power to tax without proper approval from 
parliamentarians.141  The judge apparently feared that Cromwell would imprison him if 
he ruled against the Crown.142  Justice Rolle’s concerns were reflected by an address by a 
Member of Parliament in 1656 that spoke to the arbitrary rule of Cromwell in the Cony 
case:  
Nor shall any man under these rigid tax Masters retayne any longer a 
property in his estate then this our Grand Signeur shall please to continue 
him in it . . . It was then little imagin’d that the time should come, when 
this [Cromwell,] great Champion of the Lawes, should stop the Lawes in 
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theyr due course and imprison the most eminent of the long Robe for 
declaring the expresse letter of the Lawes . . . .143 
The Cony case and subsequent resignation of Justice Rolle provided fuel for the growing 
royalist cause.  Two years later in 1658 Cromwell succumbed to an infection; in 1661, his 
body was exhumed and he was posthumously beheaded with his severed head displayed 
on a pole outside Westminster Hall.144  Before any royal restoration could take place, 
however, Parliament wanted to ensure that its ability to control taxation was protected 
under the Bill of Rights.145   
E. The Glorious Revolution and the English Bill of Rights 
The ongoing struggle over who should have the right to levy taxes again served 
to influence subsequent expansions of individual liberty.  In the events leading up to the 
Glorious Revolution, a charged debate took place in 1689 within Parliament concerning 
the need to constrain the monarch’s control over taxation: 
I think we ought to be cautious of the Revenue, which is the life of the 
Government, and consider the last two Reigns.146 
We may date our misery from our bounty here.  If King Charles II had 
not had that bounty from you, he had never attempted what he had 
done.147  
The members of the Commons recognized that the granting or withholding of revenue 
powers was their primary bargaining tool with the Crown.148  Unhappy with the rule of 
King James II, they decided to take action and ousted the King who fled to France, to be 
replaced by two new co-rulers, William and Mary after they had agreed to accept a 
Declaration of Right drawn up by the parliamentarians.149  The new King and Queen 
were forced to offer concessions that expanded individual rights against arbitrary taxation 
to an extent not seen within the Western world.   
On December 16, 1689, the Declaration of Right was embodied in An Act 
Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the 
Crown, which is now known as the Bill of Rights.150  For the first time, the Bill of Rights 
clearly set out the position that it was Parliament and not the Crown that had authority to 
enact a tax: “That levying money for or to the Use of the Crowne by pretence of 
Prerogative without Grant of Parlyament for longer time or in other manner than the same 
is or shall be granted is illegall.”151   
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The new power over taxation forced Parliament to develop more systematic 
methods of governance.  Unlike previous Parliaments which in many ways acted as a 
rubber stamp for proposed revenue measures passed by royal prerogative, the new 
Parliament became a functional and increasingly powerful institution within England.  
The members of the Commons were closer to the lives and needs of their constituents—at 
least when compared to the king—which bred a far more efficient means of taxation that, 
in turn, brought in more and more revenues.  Miller suggests this enhanced efficiency and 
stability within tax administration led to a dramatic growth in England’s ability to wage 
successful wars and English dominance of world affairs throughout the next two hundred 
years.152 
The passage of the Bill of Rights is sometimes portrayed as a turning point in 
world history.  With its passage, England became a constitutional monarchy and full-
fledged member of the modern world. 
IV. TAX DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
The final step toward the formation of a constitutional democracy with more 
representative democratic institutions for taxation was left to the Americans under their 
rallying cry of "No taxation without representation."  The American innovation would 
have a profound political impact in shaping the modern world by influencing the 
subsequent push toward a parliamentary democracy in England and the development of 
other constitutional democracies.   
A. The Stamp Act as a Unifying Source for Colonial Anger 
The story of how the Boston Tea Party sparked the American Revolution is well 
known.  While there is ongoing debate surrounding the role of taxes in sparking the 
American Revolution,153 the historical record shows that taxation provided a significant 
motive for American anger at English rule: the riots, mobs and political debates circled 
mainly around taxation.154  The source of this discontent may have been attributable to 
taxes promoted by an earlier Stamp Act, and not to the later and more notorious tea tax.155 
The tax disputes once again find their origin in a financially over-stretched 
English monarchy: by 1763, England had successfully defeated France in the French and 
Indian War to gain dominion over most of North America.156  Success had come at a 
steep price, and the country was left with a crippling debt.  The English enacted a number 
of duties on certain articles such as rum and spirits, and continued to regulate trade 
through acts such as the Navigation Acts of 1760 and the Sugar Act of 1764.157  In 1765, 
the English Parliament enacted the Stamp Act, which was the first direct tax on the 
American colonies.158  The Act placed a tax on an array of goods including newspapers, 
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almanacs, pamphlets, legal documents, insurance policies, licenses, playing cards and 
dice: these products had to carry a tax stamp, and non-payment could potentially result in 
fines or even incarceration through judgment of an admiralty court, which sat without 
juries.159   
Colonial governments protested that the tax amounted to an illegal exaction 
passed without representation.  Patrick Henry introduced "four or five" resolutions 
against the Stamp Act in the Virginia House of Burgesses; the resolutions were reprinted 
in newspapers and distributed throughout the colonies.160   The colonial governments 
mobilized quickly in opposition to the tax; nine of the thirteen colonies sent delegates to 
New York to speak at the Stamp Act Congress, which issued a "Declaration of Rights 
and Grievances."161 
The Stamp Act played an important role in unifying the colonies against arbitrary 
English rule.  For instance, the Sons of Liberty—the individuals behind the Boston Tea 
Party—were formed as a result of this new tax.162  The colonists organized a series of 
protests against the tax.  Mobs appeared throughout the colonies, forcing stamp agents to 
resign and discouraging merchants from importing British goods.163 
In 1766, Benjamin Franklin traveled to London to appear before Parliament.  His 
answers to parliamentary queries show the visceral opposition to the tax felt by the 
colonists:164 
Q: Was it an opinion in America before 1763, that the parliament had no 
right to lay taxes and duties there? 
Franklin: I never heard any objection to the right of laying duties to 
regulate commerce; but a right to lay internal taxes was never supposed 
to be in parliament, as we are not represented there. 
. . . . 
Q: Is there no means of obliging [the colonists] to erase those resolutions 
[against the Stamp Act]? 
Franklin: None that I know of; they will never do it, unless compelled by 
force of arms. 
Q: Is there a power on earth that can force them to erase them? 
Franklin: No power, how great soever, can force men to change their 
opinions.165 
Ironically, it would take an Englishman, William Pitt, the Earl of Chatham, former Prime 
Minister and famed orator, to offer what was arguably the most astute criticism of the 
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Stamp Act.  On January 14, 1766, Pitt, suffering from a cold, rose in Parliament to 
deliver a blistering attack on unrepresentative taxation:166  
It is my Opinion, that this Kingdom has no Right to lay a Tax on the 
Colonies; at the same time I assert the Authority of this Kingdom over 
the Colonies to be Sovereign and Supreme in every Circumstance of 
Government and Legislation whatsoever; they were Subjects of this 
Kingdom, equally intitled by your Laws to all the natural Rights of 
Manhood and the peculiar Privileges of Englishmen . . .  
We therefore, in this House [of Commons], give and grant, what is our 
own; but in an American Tax, what do we do?  We, your Majesty’s 
Commons of Great Britain, give and grant to your majesty, what?  Our 
own Property?  No;  we give and grant to your Majesty, the Property of 
your Majesty’s Commons in America, an Absurdity in Terms. This 
Distinction between Legislation and Taxation, is essentially necessary to 
Liberty . . . 
. . . . 
Upon the Whole, I will beg leave to tell the House what is my real 
Opinion: It is, that the Stamp Act be repealed absolutely, totally, and 
immediately.167 
As Pitt’s concluding line makes perfectly clear, he views direct taxation ("internal taxes") 
without representation to be unacceptable but, like Franklin, accepts certain taxes 
("external taxes") such as import duties as they are mainly directed toward the regulation 
of international trade.168  In light of the opposition by the colonists as well as Pitt and 
others, the Stamp Act was finally repealed in 1766.169 
Historians sometimes credit the Stamp Act protests with bringing together the 
colonial governments for the first time to explore their common interests; they began to 
think of themselves as part of a potentially greater political union, to think of themselves 
as "Americans." 170   The cause that united these men—anger at unrepresentative 
taxation—provided an opportunity for these colonists to see that they were all opposed to 
arbitrary English rule and quite prepared to take action to stop it.   
B. Tea Tax, Rebellions and Congressional Responses 
After a brief period of rectitude, the English government responded with renewed 
enthusiasm for taxes and import duties on a variety of goods from paper, lead and glass to 
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paint under the Townsend Acts of 1767.171  The colonies answered back by organizing 
even more protests and by boycotting the purchase on certain English goods. 172  
Moreover, this legislation created three new admiralty courts to try Americans who 
ignored the law (the existing court in Halifax, Nova Scotia, was thought to be too far 
away.)173  Rising anger against the taxes also led to the Boston Massacre, a violent 
confrontation in March 1770 between a mob of Boston residents and English troops 
guarding a government building that housed customs agents. 174   Again, the English 
accommodated the American views and rescinded all of the taxes with the exception of a 
tax on tea in part to emphasize and symbolize English authority over the colonies.175  
Parliament subsequently passed the Tea Act in 1773 to grant a monopoly on 
international trade to the East India Company by exempting this company from the 
normal duty on tea exported from England; this would enable the company to undercut 
the price charged for tea by other companies.176  The Parliamentarians hoped that the use 
of duties instead of direct taxes would appease the colonists (taxes that regulated trade 
were deemed acceptable by many Americans at the time.)177  On December 16, 1773, 
Samuel Adams and his group of patriots, the Sons of Liberty, swept onto a cargo ship 
filled with tea belonging to the East India Company, which they dumped into Boston 
Harbor, causing a loss of roughly 10,000 pounds.178  More "tea parties" followed in other 
coastal ports.179 
Angered at the colonial upstarts, the English passed legislation in 1774 to punish 
the colonists—named Intolerable Acts or Coercive Acts by the colonists—that sought to 
close ports such as the Boston Harbor until the tea losses were repaid, curtailed the 
powers of the Massachusetts assembly, and required colonists to provide housing and 
supplies to British soldiers.180  These Acts in turn led to widespread anger and discontent 
with British rule.181  They decided to form a congress with representatives from the 
different colonial governments.  On October 14, 1774, the First Continental Congress 
passed a resolution called the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental 
Congress, which denied the power of Parliament to tax the colonies and presented the 
king of England with a list of grievances.  Notably, the first recital sets out opposition to 
unjust British taxes: 
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Whereas, since the close of the last war, the British Parliament, claiming 
a power of right to bind the people of America, by statute, in all cases 
whatsoever, hath, in some Acts, expressly imposed taxes on them, and in 
others, under various pretences, but in fact for the purpose of raising a 
revenue, hath imposed rates and duties payable in these Colonies, 
established a Board of Commissioners, with unconstitutional powers, and 
extended the jurisdiction of Courts of Admiralty, not only for collecting 
the said duties, but for the trial of causes merely arising within the body 
of a County . . . .182 
The Declaration goes on to set out certain inalienable rights enjoyed by Americans, in 
part by harkening back to English principles of justice and references to the Magna Carta 
and its descendants: 
That the inhabitants of the English Colonies in North America, by the 
immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English Constitution, and 
the several Charters or Compacts, have the following Rights: 
. . .  
Resolved, 4: That the foundation of English Liberty, and of all free 
Government, is a right in the people to participate in their Legislative 
Council: and as the English Colonists are not represented, and from their 
local and other circumstances cannot be properly represented in the 
British Parliament, they are entitled to a free and exclusive power of 
legislation in their several Provincial Legislatures, where their right of 
Representation can alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and 
internal polity, subject only to the negative of their Sovereign, in such 
manner as has been heretofore used and accustomed.183 
Anger at British taxation continued until the Continental Congress adopted the 
Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, which included as one of its twenty-seven 
grievances against the King the imposition of “Taxes on us without our Consent . . . .”184  
These passages are consistent with constitutional law writings that emphasize control 
over taxation, not theoretical concerns surrounding individual liberty, as the principal 
unifying force for resisting English rule.185 
C. Taxation and the New Republic 
Rebellions against taxation did not end with the conclusion of the Revolution.  
Although the new American government was born out of a tax revolt, it could not 
function without levying its own taxes.  Only a few years earlier not paying taxes was 
deemed patriotic but was now an act of treason. 
Beginning in the summer of 1786, Daniel Shays, a former captain in the 
Continental Army led his followers (known as Shaysites) in an attack against tax 
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collectors and shopkeepers out of anger over burdensome taxes and debt.186  After the 
suppression of these actions in Massachusetts, fourteen of the participants were put on 
trial then convicted and sentenced to death for treason (although they were later pardoned 
from the death sentence).187  The significance of Shays's Rebellion is twofold: firstly, it 
exemplifies how issues of taxation remained in the American consciousness despite the 
end of the Revolution; and secondly, there is reason to believe that Shays played an 
integral part in the formation of the Constitution.188  Under a more recent view, the 
Federalists exaggerated the threat of the rebellion so as to increase national power.189   
Even after the Constitution was ratified, in a similar series of events, in 1794 the 
federal government no longer trusted the Pennsylvanian government to suppress the 
Whiskey Rebellions that were spreading throughout the state.190  Many “inhabitants of 
Western Pennsylvania . . . derived their principal income from the manufacture and sale 
of whisky. . . .”191  Outrage swept across the region as a levy of seven cents per gallon 
was issued by the U.S. government.192  Of the original thirty-five insurgents who were 
indicted on charges of treason193 only two men, John Mitchell and Philip Vigol, were 
convicted of high treason.194  Both men were sentenced to death but were later pardoned 
by President Washington.195 
While opposition to British taxation may have served as a unifying force during 
the Revolution, in constructing the Articles of Confederation taxation played a prominent 
role in dividing federalists and anti-federalists.  According to one view, the most 
important fight in ratifying the constitution was over whether the federal government 
would have the power to exact taxes in time of war.196  The debate and subsequent 
resolution over whether the federal government or individual states would have the power 
to tax the citizens played a prominent role in shaping the structure of the American 
political system.  In a correspondence with Jefferson, Washington wrote that he was 
willing to accept any tolerable compromise except for the amendment preventing direct 
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taxation.197  It was imperative for the successful operations of the federal government to 
that it have taxation powers. 
Without the power to tax, the Articles of Confederation lasted seven years.  With 
the power to tax, the Constitution has lasted over 200 years.198  The issue of taxation was 
a point of contention with both sides of the debate: “Tax connects with . . . almost all 
other powers, and [tax] at least will in process of time draw all other after it.”199  The 
power over taxation was seen as the foundation for all other governmental powers in the 
new union.  After Virginia rejected the Bill of Rights, Madison’s source said that the 
opposition was reducible “to a single point, the power of direct tax.”200 
In 1789, the United States Constitution came into effect giving the federal 
government the power to directly tax individuals.  The federal government, rather than 
acting as an agent of the states, became the representative of the people.201  Consequently, 
“We the people” would be the sovereign, not the states.202  This fundamental Western 
political ideology is the result of the relationship based on taxation between the federal 
government and its citizens.  Had the states been granted the exclusive power of direct 
taxation, the political landscape in America would no doubt have a different history, 
present and future.   
V. SHAPING ANGLO-AMERICAN POLITICS, LAWS AND NORMS 
The previous Parts described how tax law expansions in England and the United 
States influenced the formation and development of certain political and legal 
institutions.  We saw an iterative process whereby individuals in both countries rebelled 
against "bad" taxes (i.e., unrepresentative taxes without due process protections for tax 
disputes), which led to the passage of "good" tax laws that reduced arbitrary tax measures 
and promoted procedural protections against unfair taxation.  This Part outlines how 
these developments influenced broader social change, including the eventual acceptance 
of liberalism as a guiding political philosophy.203  No attempt is made to analyze the 
many other factors that promoted this acceptance; rather, the focus is directed at briefly 
underscoring the role played by historical tax developments in the Anglo-American 
world. 
A. The Political/Legal Effect 
As we have seen, the political struggle against "bad" tax laws shaped the 
development of certain political institutions.204  For instance, the Magna Carta of 1215 
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and the Confirmation of Charters of 1297 provided for the creation of a Common 
Council to approve certain royal tax measures—this Council was likely the first "formal" 
proto-democratic body that exercised ongoing authority over a king’s decision-making 
power.205  By the 17th Century, systematic government institutions—tax agents, clerks, 
record managers, bookkeepers, tax prosecution offices—were needed to administrate 
increasingly complex tax laws controlled by the British Parliament.  Finally, the Stamp 
Act Congress and the First Continental Congress, where representatives from the various 
colonial governments met to debate unfair English taxes, created legislative bodies that 
would be subsequently replicated in America and elsewhere. 
In addition to their impact on government bodies, early Anglo-American tax laws 
played a formative role in influencing the path of law and the development of legal 
institutions.  As mentioned, legal historians sometimes emphasize how Western rule of 
law conceptions have been shaped by the criminal and civil procedural aspects of early 
law.206  An alternative view provided by this article is that criminal and civil procedure 
protections were historically interwoven with taxation concerns.207 
Concerns surrounding intrusive tax searches as well as incarceration for non-
payment of taxes without due process were certainly warranted.208  We reviewed efforts 
by King John to use scutage (i.e., payments in lieu of military service) to manipulate his 
noblemen and clergy in the 13th Century.  Later on English kings would deploy forced 
loans, ship-money taxes and other means to collect revenues.  In all cases, the 
uncooperative taxpayers could be jailed or worse without a fair hearing.  Similarly, 
American colonists could be imprisoned by foreign-controlled admiralty courts for 
refusal to pay taxes.  An early impetus for civil and criminal procedure protections was 
hence the need to inhibit abusive tax collection practices by agents of the state.  These 
legal protections in turn required institutional support—lawyers, courts, judges, a 
properly-trained police force and so on—to gain practical effect.  
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B. Shaping Norms 
The iterative process whereby individuals rebelled against bad taxes and 
demanded good tax laws also influenced the development of norms—the view that an 
individual’s interests in his or her property and income (indeed his or her very 
personhood) should not be placed at the unfettered discretion of a king. How did tax laws 
shape normative beliefs?  Early tax laws—the Charter of Liberties, the Magna Carta and 
the Confirmation of Charters in particular—showed pre-modern man that the king (at one 
time considered divine) could be bound to a set of human-devised rules that restricted his 
ability to tax their persons and properties.  For the first time, wealthy noblemen saw that 
they could have some control over their own properties regardless of the king’s wishes.  
This influenced how they perceived themselves and their relationship with their ruler.209   
Tax laws played an influential role in shaping how certain community 
members—beginning with powerful barons in the 13th Century, expanding to an elite 
English bourgeoisie in the 17th Century, and ending with American white male property 
owners in the 18th Century—situated themselves within their larger social universes.  
Over time, these individuals came to believe they had a moral entitlement to keep the 
fruits of their labors.  These norms were internalized and later rationalized by the political 
philosophy of liberalism, which in turn served to reinforce the norms and the greater 
desire for "good" or "just" tax laws.  In other words, tax laws themselves helped shape 
important political philosophical ideas within the Anglo-American world.210 
Consider the relationship between these developments and the works of John 
Locke, one of the founders of the political philosophy of liberalism that has been so 
influential in the Anglo-American world.211  The liberal tradition “is generally viewed as 
a relatively coherent set of principles centering on the defense of individual rights and 
liberties, the security of property, and the notion of limited government.”212  In particular, 
Chapter 5 of Locke’s Second Treatise on Government sets out his views on the 
relationship between private property, representative taxation, and the state. 213  Near the 
end of the 17th Century in England, Locke offered the radical suggestion that all men 
were born equal to the King.  Because all men are created equal, Locke reasoned, they 
enjoyed certain "natural rights" endowed by God.214  In particular, because God put in 
                                                 
209 See, e.g., McIlwain, supra note 205 (discussing how the Magna Carta influenced how the 
barons’ viewed their relationship with the King). 
210 Schumpeter in particular urged the importance of studying fiscal history to illuminate present 
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the best starting points for an investigation of society, especially though not exclusively of its political life.”  
See SCHUMPETER, supra note 3, at 101.   
211 See, e.g., JAMES TULLY, AN APPROACH TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: LOCKE IN CONTEXTS 137 
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(1996). 
213 For discussion, see Arthur Cockfield, Income Taxes and Individual Liberty: A Lockean 
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214 Philosophers have subsequently reconstructed Locke’s and other natural rights theorists’ 
arguments by using secular premises such as Rawls’s "behind the veil" or originalist position analysis to 
derive essentially the same outcome as Locke: Locke’s natural rights have been reconstructed as today’s 
human rights.  For a discussion of how natural rights theories developed into contemporary human rights 
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each person the drive toward self-preservation then God must also have given this 
individual the right to secure survival.215  Locke maintained that “every Man has Property 
in his own Person.  This no Body has any Right to but himself.  The Labour of his Body, 
and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.”216  To secure these natural 
rights to private property, individuals require a certain amount of freedom from state 
interference as well as the “arbitrary will” of other men.217   
To Locke, the preservation of property was the “great and chief end” of 
government.218  Locke accepted property regulation and taxation but, harkening back to 
the Magna Carta, only if consent is granted by the people’s representatives.219  Locke 
wrote that individuals have a moral duty to rebel against unjust rulers who do not respect 
private property rights, providing a moral foundation for the (English) Glorious 
Revolution and the subsequent American Revolution through the view that violent 
rebellion was the only answer to unrepresentative taxation.   
We have seen several arguments against unjust tax laws that anticipated 
subsequent claims by Locke and others in the liberal tradition.220  The earliest tax laws—
the Charter of Liberties and the Magna Carta—placed limited constraints on royal 
taxation powers under the view that the king was not God-like and infallible (or at least 
the view that the king could be forced to provide limited political concessions to other 
powerful political figures).  More cogently, arguments by 17th Century English lawyers 
frequently focused on the unfairness of arbitrary taxes imposed by royal fiat.  Such tax 
measures were likened to slavery because they exposed a subject’s property or person to 
the whim of the king.  Some of these legal arguments deployed rhetoric similar to that 
used by Locke when setting out his famed labor theory of property (e.g., notions that 
“every man has property in his own person”).221  While the historical record is unclear, 
these legal arguments surrounding taxation, which were widely-published and circulated 
during the era, may have influenced Locke’s views. 
In any event, during critical eras of English and U.S. history, important legal 
documents such as the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights, and the American 
Declaration of Independence promoted democratic constraints on the use of state power 
to assess and collect taxes.  These tax laws mediated the tension between the needs of the 
state—that requires revenues for various purposes—and the needs of its 
subjects/citizens—whose skills the state increasingly relied on for productive economic 
activities—and their desire for ongoing political freedoms.  Over time, the idea that 
individuals are entitled to equal treatment under the law, and possess inalienable human 
rights, emerged in part as a result of these tax laws.  
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The perhaps obvious point here is that liberalism did not spring whole cloth from 
the ether, but was shaped by hundreds of years of practices and beliefs; the less obvious 
point is that liberalism was influenced in part by centuries’ worth of tax law 
developments that enshrined protections against arbitrary exactions.  In other words, 
without these developments it may have been the case that the English and Americans 
would not have been as amenable to internalize the values of liberalism (and 
republicanism).   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The stream of history flows with eddies, currents, cross-currents, rapids and 
riffles: it is always a dangerous exercise to isolate one influential factor without taking 
into account the broader context and the multitude of factors that influence the course of 
history.  Recognizing these dangers, this article has strived to place tax law developments 
within their broader social and political context to show how early English and American 
tax laws played an influential role in developing and reinforcing increasingly progressive 
political and legal institutions. 
Several centuries in particular—13th and 17th century England as well as 18th 
century United States—are notable for the ways that tax law developments were 
interwoven with important legal and political developments that witnessed the long 
march toward modern democracies.  During these centuries, we see the rise of 
increasingly representative governments, and an emphasis on the need for the rule of law 
with due process protections against arbitrary state rule.  While the historical processes 
that influenced these developments are complex, tax laws played an important role. 
By securing rights against arbitrary taxation, individuals began to enjoy enhanced 
security and wealth, which led to even greater yearnings for freedom.  Under this article’s 
account, the political struggle against "bad" taxes (i.e., unrepresentative taxes without due 
process protections for tax disputes) led to the development of "good" tax laws (i.e., laws 
that promoted representative taxes along with procedural protections against arbitrary 
imprisonment for non-payment of taxes) that helped to create and shape Anglo-American 
legal and political institutions, as well as liberal beliefs. 
